Therefore, man’s felicity does not lie in the aforesaid goods. [21] Now, what the fifth argument suggests, that the will is higher than the intellect, in the sense of moving it, is clearly false. Hence, if honor is not the highest good, much less is glory. HOW GOD IS THE END OF ALL THINGS [1] An intellectual substance has still another kind of knowledge of God. So, this man is not the cause of a man, except in the sense that he is the cause of a human form coming to be in this matter. This the process of generation shows: at the start of generation there is the embryo living with plant life, later with animal life, and finally with human life. So the things also that are of God, no man knows, but the Spirit of God” (1 Cor. For instance, the form of a house, which is the proper product of the builder, appears later than the preparation of the cement, stones, and timbers, which are made by the lower workmen who come under the builder. This is so because the agent intellect’s own act of understanding is the act of understanding of ‘the man who understands through it, as was said already. Now, that is more appropriate to reason which reason has within itself than which it produces in another thing. And thus, its process of generation must be completed at some time, unless there be an impediment, because no process of generation tends to an indefinite termination. Consequently, Boethius says in his book, The Trinity, that “forms which are in matter have come from forms which are without matter.” And on this point, Plato’s statement is verified, that forms separated from matter are the principles of forms that are in it. Now, a man would not believe in things that are unseen but proposed to him by another man unless he thought that this other man had more perfect knowledge of these proposed things than he himself who does not see them. For the situation is not like that of a man who has built a house and has then gone away, and, while he is not working and is absent, his work stands. So, evil, as a specific difference in the genus of moral matters, does not imply something that is evil in its own essence, but something that is good in itself, though evil for man, inasmuch as it takes away the order of reason which is the good for man. For instance, moral evil is present in a natural good, while a natural evil, which is a privation of form, is present in matter which is a good, in the sense of a being in potency. Hence, they are not intelligible in a purposeless way, as the sun (to pursue Aristotle’s example) is visible, yet not in a purposeless way, simply because the owl cannot see it. Hence it is said of man in the Psalms (8:8) in a statement directed to God: “Thou bast subjected all things under his feet,” And Aristotle says, in the Politics I [5: 1254b 9], that man has natural dominion over all animals. That is also why the name Archangel is composed of both names, for Archangels are called, as it were, Principal Angels. But felicity is the proper good of man. 3:12) [4] Besides, suppose that two things are not united at first, and then later they are united; this must be done by changing both of them, or at least one. But it would be contrary to the essential character of divine providence if all things occurred by necessity, as we showed. [4] On the other hand, Avicenna maintained that all substantial forms flow forth from the agent Intelligence. [5] However, it is clear that Aristotle, whose view the aforementioned philosophers try to follow, did not think that man’s ultimate felicity is to be found in such a connection. Consequently, that it could in no way understand separate substances is quite necessary, since it could not be separate in its own being. Therefore, all other creatures are ruled by means of rational creatures under divine providence. But this knowledge admits of a mixture of many errors. [1] As a matter of fact, human souls bold the lowest rank in relation to the other intellectual substances, because, as we said above,” at the start of their existence they receive a knowledge of divine providence, wherein they know it only in a general sort of way. THAT THROUGH THE VISION OF GOD ONE BECOMES A PARTAKER OF ETERNAL LIFE [15] Moreover, pleasure seems to be simply the repose of the will in some appropriate good, as desire is the inclination of the will toward the attainment of some good. Of course, the quiddity of a genus or species of sensible things cannot be separate in actual being from a given material individual, unless, perhaps, we maintain with the Platonists separate forms of things, but this has been disproved by Aristotle. Lectures on St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles I Summa Contra Gentiles I, chaps. Nor do we find any action in human affairs, except speculative thought, that is not directed to some other end. Thus, for those to whom money is an end, we say that to possess the money is their end, but not the loving of it, not the craving of it. But the substantial form is a more perfect act than accidental form. Taken away, also, would be justice which rewards and punishes, if man could not freely do good or evil. Therefore, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to be in this life. Hence, man’s natural desire tends, in the process of knowing, toward some definite end. Some of these are incorruptible and, as they can suffer no defect in their natural being, so in their own actions they never fail to follow the order to the end which is prearranged for them. But, if we take into consideration in this motion of heavy and light bodies, not the final place but an intermediate one, then just as an approach may naturally be made to it, so also may a recession be naturally made from it. Therefore, it does not pertain to divine providence to prohibit evil entirely from things. Chapter 62 Therefore, no body is the cause of the being of anything, in so far as it is being, but it is the cause of its being moved toward being, that is, of the thing’s becoming. Therefore, the created intellect cannot be elevated to the vision of the divine substance by any light. From this it follows that He is the Lord of the things that He has made, for we are masters of the things that are subject to our will. [3] Again, everything that is moved must be moved by another being, as we proved earlier. [7] Again, whatever possesses an essence is either a form itself, or has a form. For, by the fact that they tend to their own perfection they tend to the good, since a thing is good to the extent that it is perfect. [7] Again, it is impossible for a person to will to abandon a good which he is enjoying, unless because of some evil which he perceives in the enjoyment of that good; even if it be simply that it is thought to stand in the way of a greater good. [3] Again, the will is higher than sense appetite, for it moves itself, as we said above. For this reason, the Philosopher says, in Ethics I [10: 1100b 5], that “we do not regard the happy man as a sort of chameleon.” Now, in this life there is no certain stability, for to any man, no matter how happy he is reputed to be, illnesses and misfortunes may possibly come, and by them he may be hindered in that operation, whatever it may be, with which felicity is identified. Hence, whether it begins to see God at the start of its existence, or later, something must be added to its nature. However, if its being could not be participated by another, it could not be the form of any other thing, for then it would be determined within itself by its own being, just as material things are by their own matter. So, the nature of a heavy or light body is the active principle of its motion, while the nature of a celestial body is the passive principle of its motion. [9] Moreover, this sort of light raises the created intellect to the vision of God, not on the basis of a diminution of its distance from the divine substance, but by virtue of a power which it receives from -God in relation to such an effect; even though it remains far away from God in its being, as the second argument suggested. [3] In fact, the operation of the man enjoying felicity must be without defect. Therefore, man’s highest good does not lie in sense. In fact, just as a nature is determined to one objective by its power, so is the will determined to one objective by its wisdom, whereby the will is infallibly directed to one end. Therefore, the good of natural aptitude can be infinitely decreased by moral evil. But the ones which are next to these, and which are moved immediately by those which always exist in the same way, retain a certain type of immobility by the fact that they are always moved in the same way, which is true of the celestial bodies. Instead, just as God is an agent only, so is corporeal substance passive only, for it is the lowest in the genus of things. If, then, we know concerning the soul what it is, through the soul itself, then this will be something naturally known. The same should be true for all cases of change. HOW MAN'S EVERY DESIRE IS FULFILLED IN THAT ULTIMATE FELICITY So, if the agent’s desire is not directed to some definite thing, but, rather, the actions are multiplied to infinity, as was said, then the active principles must be multiplied to infinity. Therefore, it is impossible for felicity to consist essentially in an act of the will. But disorder of this kind does not exclude divine providence; it comes about, indeed, with divine permission, as a result of the deficiency of lower agents, just as we explained in connection with other evils. Now, just as a man is inclined through his will to the end and reposes in it, so do physical bodies in nature possess natural inclinations to proper ends, and these inclinations come to rest when the end has already been reached. But it is beyond the capacity of the created intellect, in the sense that it exceeds its power; just as sensible objects of extreme character are beyond the capacity of sense power. Therefore, this position detracts from the divine power. Chapter 27 For there is present in heavy and light bodies a natural aptitude for motion contrary to that in which they are moved by us, and so they are moved by us through violence. For instance, the art of navigation, to which the end, that is the use, of a ship pertains, is architectonic and preceptive in relation to the art of shipbuilding. [5] Moreover, everything that acts is a real thing. Potency, too, is a good thing, for potency tends toward act, as appears in every instance of change. Therefore, the felicity of man should not be identified with honors. So, felicity is not to be located in these pleasures. In the example of the man who throws his merchandise into the sea in order to save himself [cf. [3] Again, the end is that in which the appetitive inclination of an agent or mover, and of the thing moved, finds its rest. So that, in this view, the informing of things would be in continuous process, as if a thing would not need an agent cause except while in the process of becoming. Therefore, immediately at the start, man can know separate substances through the agent intellect. Therefore, we must say that the defect pre-existing in the will is not natural, to avoid the conclusion that the will sins in everyone of its acts. [7] Again, there is no fault to be found, except in the case of things that are for the sake of an end. That is why handwas created nude by nature, since he is able to make clothes for, himself from other things; just as nature also provided him with no appropriate nourishment, except milk, because he can obtain food for himself from a variety of things. It appears, then, from his words, that we see God Himself, Who is His own truth, and thus we know other things through Him. But to the stone in which color is present, neither the action of the power of sight as it sees nor the action of the sun as it enlightens can be attributed. [2] Felicity, indeed, is a perfect operation of the intellect as is clear from what we have said. Therefore, divine providence, being most perfect, extends to singulars. Chapter 58 For, if God were to withdraw His rule from it, the world could not stand, even for the flick of an eye.” [7] Then, the third type of understandings consider the very arrangement of the divine judgments in themselves. [6] Now, just as in the activities of one man disorder arises from the fact that understanding follows the lead of sensual power, while the sensual power is dragged down to the movement of the body by virtue of some disorder of the body, as is evident in the case of men who limp, so also does disorder arise in a human government, as a result of a man getting control, not because of the eminence of his understanding, but either because he usurps dominion for himself by bodily strength or because someone is set up as a ruler on the basis of sensual affection. But God is the first cause in the order of final causes, since He is the highest in the order of goods. So, too, the posterior end is the cause of the preceding end being intended as an end, for a thing is not moved toward a proximate end unless for the sake of a last end. But, what is appropriate to something is good for it. [14] However, a difficulty seems to result from this investigation. And this, in fact, must lead back to God, either mediately or immediately, since every lower art and type of knowledge must get its principles from a higher one, as we also see in the speculative and operative sciences. Now, the voluntary agent attains the divine likeness because it acts freely, for we showed in Book One [88] that there is free choice in God. Chapter 45 9:9); and again: “He walks about the poles of heaven, and He does not consider our things” (Job 22:14). In fact, the contemplation of truth begins in this life, but reaches its climax in the future; whereas the active and civic life does not go beyond the limits of this life. [4] Moreover,-all created things are, in a sense, images of the first agent, that is, of God, “for the agent makes a product to his own likeness. Thus, Boethius introduces a certain philosopher who asks: “If God exists, whence comes evil?” [De consolatione philosophiae I, 4]. [2] Indeed, the governance of every provident ruler is ordered either to the attainment, or the increase, or the preservation of the perfection of the things governed. So, felicity ought to be some good which man may attain by his own will. Rather, the form is required so that the species may be complete. But it seems incompatible with the view of the faith, in regard to this: it says that not all particulars are immediately subject to divine providence. Of course, it is a different situation in the case of a heavy or light body which, considered in its nature, is not indifferent to every place, but is determined by virtue of its form to a place of its own. But man is better than riches, for they are but things subordinated to man’s use. So, there is for man some knowledge of God which is higher than the knowledge of faith: either the man who proposes the faith sees the truth immediately, as is the case when we believe in Christ; or he takes it immediately from one who does see, as when we believe the Apostles and Prophets. [2] For everything that is an imperfect member of any species desires to attain the perfection of its species. [4] Having observed these points, we should understand that not everything that is apart from intention is necessarily fortuitous or a matter of chance, as the first argument claimed. 10:13, 20). First, as we understand by means of the intellect which is the power from which such an operation proceeds; hence, both the intellect itself is said to understand, and also the intellect’s act of understanding becomes our act of understanding. But the occurrence of evil is not called fortuitous, a matter of chance, nor does it happen rarely, but always or in most cases. Thus, among created things, what God cares for most is the order of the universe. And this seems to have been Aristotle’s view on felicity. Likewise, the first willed object must not be the will’s act but some other good thing. And for this reason the celestial power is enough, without a univocal agent, to produce some imperfect forms. Take, for example, a man who directs his intention to the enjoyment of the sweetness of wine: if intoxication is the result of drinking the wine, this is neither fortuitous nor a matter of chance. [13] Furthermore, a body tending toward its proper place by natural appetite is moved more forcibly and swiftly as it approaches its end. For, since God is pure act, things are more or less distant from Him on this basis: that they are more or less in act or in potency. In fact, there is no point in going on without end in the working of natural appetite, since natural desire would then be futile, because it is impossible to get to the end of an endless series. In fact, if there have been any men who have discovered the truth about divine things in such a way, by means of demonstration, that no falsity attached to their judgment, it is clear that there have been few such. Therefore, this vision also consists in a participation in eternity. This latter kind of infinity is rationally unknown, because it is like matter devoid of form, which is the principle of knowledge. [9] They also add, in regard to this point, that corporeal substance is at the greatest distance from the first agent; hence, it does not seem to them that active power could reach the whole way to corporeal substance. Therefore, happiness, or felicity, consists substantially and principally in an act of the intellect rather than in an act of the will. [3] Again, that which is supreme in any genus is the cause of all the members that belong in that genus; thus, fire, which is the hottest of corporeal things, is the cause of the beat of other things. [8] It is also apparent that the same effect is not attributed to a natural cause and to divine power in such a way that it is partly done by God, and partly by the natutal agent; rather, it is wholly done by both, according to a different way, just as the same effect is wholly attributed to the instrument and also wholly to the principal agent. That divine providence does not entirely exclude evil from things, Chapter 72. Chapter 61. [8] Therefore, we should not gather from these words of Augustine that God can be seen in His substance in this life, but only as in a mirror. Now, through its operation, one thing becomes the cause of another. So, either they never were produced by God, or their being is always flowing forth from God as long as they exist. in regard to the last and most perfect act that matter can attain, the inclination of matter whereby it desires form must be inclined as toward the ultimate end of generation. Therefore, the celestial bodies move and govern the lower bodies. For a good is loved not only when possessed but also when not possessed. Consequently, it is clear that singulars exist for the sake of the universal nature. Therefore, no person is happy in this life. Of course, it would be a matter of chance if this result followed in but few cases. First, because the natural tendency in heavy and light things is determined to one place; hence, just as such a body naturally tends to this place, so does it go against nature in receding from it. Therefore, all other creatures must be moved and regulated by means of intellectual powers. Hence, corruption does not occur by chance, nor as something that happens in few cases; even though privation at times is not an unqualified evil, but is only so in relation to some definite thing, as has been said. [10] Now, we have to show that the foregoing reply does not invalidate the arguments which we have given above. [3] Besides, intelligible being is not of lesser scope than natural being, but perhaps it is more extensive; indeed, intellect is from its origin capable of understanding all things existing in reality, and it also understands things that have no natural being, such as negations and privations. But the will moves the intellect rather accidentally, that is, in so far as the act of understanding is itself apprehended as good, and so is desired by the will, with the result that the intellect actually understands. [1] just as divine providence does not wholly exclude evil from things, so also it does not exclude contingency, or impose necessity on things. He gives a proof for this, in the same place, using the following argument: If those things which are understood in themselves, namely, separate substances, were not possible for us to understand, they would be for no purpose, just as if there were a visible object which could not be seen by any visual power. And again: “She reaches from end to end mightily” (Wis. 8:1), that is, from the noblest creatures down to the lowest of them. [15] Furthermore, the perfection of the effect demonstrates the perfection of the cause, for a greater power brings about a more perfect effect. This is not possible for any man to know through the principles of the speculative sciences, by which principles we are moved to a connection with the agent intellect, as they say. Now, handwho looks upon a manifold number of things with indifference no more succeeds in doing one of them than another. For the intention of the principal agent and that of the instrument are directed toward the same thing. 45:7); and again: “There is no evil in a city which God will not do” (Amos 3:6). Yet, such a defect of ordering is not a moral evil, for, if reason considers nothing, or considers any good whatever, that is still not a sin until the will inclines to an unsuitable end. But, according to Gregory, the Virtues are those related to certain particular operations, when in some special case outside the general order something has to be done miraculously. His doctrinal system and the explanations and developments made by his followers are … Now, deficiencies of this kind are far removed from God, because He knows all singular things, and He does not make an effort to understand, or require any time for it; since, by understanding Himself He knows all other things, as we showed above. Now, none of them is an effect adequately representing the power of God, as we showed in Book Two [22ff]. The Summa Contra Gentiles is not merely the only complete summary of Christian doctrine that St. Thomas has written, but also a creative and even revolutionary work of Christian apologetics composed at the precise moment when Christian thought needed to be intellectually creative in order to master and assimilate the intelligence and wisdom of the Greeks and the Arabs. [5] Furthermore, in all agent causes arranged in an orderly way the subsequent causes must act through the power of the first cause. Hence, they exist just as long as He wills them to be. Now, everything tending to its own perfection tends toward the divine likeness. Philosophy is the love of wisdom. So, it is apparent that neither this man, nor any other univocal agent in nature, is the cause of anything except the generation of this or that individual thing. In fact, corporeal power is subject to sense and intellectual power, as carrying out their command, and the sensitive power is subject to the intellectual and is included under its command. [6] Furthermore, wherever the distinction of more or less is found, there must be certain things arranged in hierarchic order, since neither negations nor privations admit of more or less. Therefore, God must be simultaneously present in all things, particularly since He continually and always preserves in being those things which He has brought into being from nonbeing, as has been shown. So, it is impossible for the active principle of celestial motion to be a nature. [1] It is evident, next, that God is the cause enabling all operating agents to operate. [4] Of course, someone could say that the ultimate end of an intellectual substance consists, in fact, in understanding the best intelligible object—not that the best object of understanding for this or that particular intellectual substance is absolutely the best intelligible object, but that, the higher an intellectual substance is, the higher will its best object of understanding be. Thus, things which imply a privation admit of increase or decrease in degree, as do the unequal and the dissimilar. Therefore, an increase of the intellectual power by means of the acquisition of a new disposition must be accomplished. [8] Hence it is said: “God created, that all things might be” (Wis. 1:14). Now, we reach a proper knowledge of a thing not only through affirmations but also through negations; for instance, it is proper to a man to be a rational animal, and so it is proper to him not to be inanimate or irrational. And so, perhaps the highest created intellectual substance may have what is absolutely best as its best intelligible object, and, consequently, its felicity will consist in understanding God, but the felicity of any lower intellectual substance will lie in the understanding of some lower intelligible object, which is, however, the highest thing understood by it. [9] Furthermore, nothing that is contemplated with wonder can be tiresome, since as long as the thing remains in wonder it continues to stimulate desire. For, just as they are caused by the substantial form which, together with matter, is the cause of all the proper accidents, these accidental forms also act by the power of the substantial form. [6] Again, we have shown above, concerning the agent intellect, that it is not a separate substance, but a part of the soul, to which Aristotle assigns this operation: “to make things actually understood” [De anima III, 5: 430a 14], and this lies within our power. And because of this, Plato claimed that the species of sensible things are certain forms separate from matter, which are the causes of being for these sensible things, according as these things participate in them. Therefore, the highest function in the order of understanding is for the rational nature of the order to be considered in relation to the end; and the second most important thing is to observe it in relation to the form; while the third thing is to know the arrangement of this order in itself, and not in a higher source. [8] It is evident, next, that the more perfect something is in its power, and the higher it is in the scale of goodness, the more does it have an appetite for a broader common good, and the more does it seek and become involved in the doing of good for beings far removed from itself. For, what the soul is no science takes as something known; rather, it is a topic proposed for investigation, starting from other items of knowledge. Therefore, it is not possible for man’s ultimate felicity to be in this life. [1] Now, from the fact that God rules things by His providence it follows that He preserves them in being. Now, things done by intellect and will are subject to the care of a provident agent, for that is what such care seems to consist in: the fact that certain things are managed through understanding. Therefore, the rational plan of divine providence demands that other creatures be ruled by intellectual creatures. 1–101) God and Creation (1–45) Intellectual Substance (46–55) Intellectual Substance and Body (56–90) But in the whole of reality things are distinct and possessed of contrary natures; yet all come together in one order, and while some things make use of the actions of others, some are also helped or commanded by others. Of itself, the mobile thing tends toward the good, but it may tend toward evil accidentally and apart from intention. Secondly, even among local motions the circular is prior. Whereas, according to the second opinion, the converse is the case, for, since it is united with us as a form, we understand it and the other separate substances. Now, the agent comes later, in the process of moving, than does the end, since the agent does not move except for the sake of the end. But the operation of prudence is not concerned with the most perfect object of understanding or reason; indeed, it does not deal with necessary objects, but with contingent problems of action. Chapter 66 [8] Now, the preceding statements are not to be understood in the sense that there is a difference between divine goodness, divine essence, and divine knowledge as it contains the arrangement of things; rather, there is a different way of considering each one. Now, due to the fact that an agent fails in regard to an end that is intended, it follows that some things occur by chance. Therefore, evil is not an essence in things. This, in fact, becomes clear to anyone who thinks over particular instances. However, things that know their end are always ordered to the good as an end, for the will, which is the appetite for a foreknown end, inclines toward something only if it has the rational character of a good, which is its object. Nor is Solomon silent on this kind of disorder, for he says: “There is an evil that I have seen under the sun, as it were by an error proceeding from the face of the prince: a fool set in high dignity” (Eccles. For instance, the larger a hot body is, granting equal intensity of heat, the more is it able to give off heat; and granting equal degree of weight, the bigger a heavy body is, the more rapidly will it be moved by natural motion; that is why it is moved more slowly by unnatural motion. 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